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Abstract 
 
The monetary incentives used to motivate DoD contractors’ schedule 
performance on Acquisition Category One programs afford them the opportunity as a 
whole to earn billions of dollars in addition to their contract award.   These incentives are 
paid 85-90% of the time regardless of schedule performance.  While these contractors are 
paid to avoid delays, there is an indication the delay increases the contractor’s stock 
value.  This research tested the theory that contract delays significantly impact the 
company’s stock returns.   The results found both positive and negative reactions to a 
firm’s value.  Delays caused by budget cuts tend to have a negative impact on a 
company’s wealth, while delays for other reasons such as a restructure or redesign tend to 
have a positive impact.   The findings illustrate that shareholders are aware the impact 
delays could have on a program and react accordingly and quickly to the market.  
Undeniably contractors cannot control the program’s funding however; there is no 
incentive for a contractor to avoid other types of delays because of the wealth it generates 
for the company.  
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CONTRACT DELAYS:  THE IMPACT ON DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE  
 
(DOD) CONTRACTORS’ WEALTH 
 
 
 
I.  Introduction 
 
 
Purpose 
 
The purpose of this research was to evaluate whether or not DoD contract delays 
on selected major acquisitions weapon systems significantly impact a firm’s stock return.  
Previous Research 
 
A recent study by Robert Carden (2006) provides a unique perspective on this 
issue, suggesting that shareholders may value contract delays.  He hypothesized there is a 
market reaction to a contractual delay, which is reflected in the company’s stock value.  
After analyzing the Army’s development and procurement of the Comanche helicopter, 
he found that a contract delay maximized Boeing’s wealth 7.1% and United 
Technology’s 8.2% within 21 days after the delay announcement. 
Nevertheless, Carden’s (2006) effort analyzed only one delay in the Comanche 
program, while there were seven previous delays (Marc Selinger, 2002) in 14 years.  
Given that Carden (2006) examined one event, we want to extend his tested hypothesis 
with further investigation.  As a result, this effort will build on Carden’s (2006) findings 
and further explore this issue.  More specifically, this research will test the extent to 
 2 
 
which contract delays significantly impact a firm’s stock return by analyzing 26 major 
weapons system programs the GAO has reviewed annually since 2003 (GAO 2003-2006, 
03-476, 04-248, 05-301, 06-391) to include a prime contractor for each program1.  
Additionally in an effort to illustrate the magnitude these findings could have on the 
DOD’s acquisition process, contract incentives will also be investigated.  If the results 
substantiate Carden’s (2006) findings and contractor’s do value contract delays, then the 
DoD is paying incentive payments for exceptional performance that the company does 
not value because the stock price increase out weighs any incentive the government can 
provide.  
Contract Incentives 
 
In order to motivate excellent contractor performance in areas determined critical 
to an acquisition program’s success (i.e., avoid cost overruns, stay on schedule, and 
deliver the capabilities expected), the DoD offers its contractors incentive fees.  As these 
monetary incentives afford contractors as a whole the opportunity to earn billions of 
dollars in addition to their signed contract amounts, it is important to understand the 
implications these incentives have on the contractor’s performance and the conditions 
under which they are paid.  The latter issue was examined, concluding the DoD paid 
billions of dollars in incentives to numerous contractors regardless of the acquisition 
outcomes.  It concluded the government pays incentives 85-90% of the time.  
Incidentally, the GAO highlighted a few development programs in its report which were 
paid an incentive for poor performance (GAO, 2005, 06-66). 
____________________ 
1 Appendix A lists the programs with abbreviations, the respective prime contractors, and their ticker 
  symbols. 
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For instance, the Army’s Comanche attack helicopter contractor exceeded the 
research and development budget by 41.2% and exceeded the time allotted to fulfill 
contract obligations by 14.8%; yet, the contractor was paid 85% of the contract incentives 
totaling $202.5 million2.  Similarly, the contractor responsible for the development of the 
Air Force’s F/A-22 Raptor was paid 91% ($848.7 million) of its contract incentives after 
research and development costs were 47.3% over budget and took 13% longer than 
promised. 
Collecting Data 
 
 In order to test whether a contract delay has a significant impact on a company’s 
stock value, an econometric event study was conducted.  Event studies look at a specific 
event and measure the impact it had on a company’s value by analyzing financial market 
data (MacKinlay, 1999).  For this research, the events were public announcements of 
contract delays in each program’s acquisition process.  Contract delay information was 
collected by analyzing major newspapers, magazine and journal articles, and business, 
finance and industry news indexed in the Lexis-Nexis database; we targeted delays of six 
months or greater.  The DoD (2005) requires only delays of six months or greater to be 
reported, therefore this research did the same.  News during the event window was 
researched ensuring there were no other announcements or incidents (e.g., stock splits or 
mergers) that may interfere with determining whether or not the market reaction was due 
to the delay.  If there were any confounding events that occurred, the delay was omitted.   
 
____________________ 
2 The Comanche program was cancelled in 2004   
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 Once the delays were identified, daily market values were observed for 200 days 
around the event which covered 188 days prior to the delay announcement and 11 days 
afterward. This timeline is consistent with other research, and it covered nearly two full  
weeks of trading and two full business quarters.   
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II. Literature Review  
 
 
 This study measured the impact major defense acquisitions’ schedule delays had 
on its contractor’s stock return.  In addition, it reviewed contract incentives because DoD 
pays contractors incentives above the contract award amount to avoid delays.  As a result, 
incentivizing could become difficult if the company’s stock value increased after a delay 
and the incentive offered no additional motivation to remain on schedule.  So to make 
this connection a bit more distinct, it is necessary for the reader to gain a basic 
understanding of both the incentive program as well as the methodology that has been 
selected to test this theory.   The literature reviewed for this study included the GAO’s 
assessments of 26 major weapon systems programs, a myriad of incentive contract 
material, the initial research conducted by Carden (2006) which hypothesized that 
contractors value delays, and the literature pertaining to the appropriate method for 
testing this study’s hypothesis.    
Weapon Systems Assessment 
 
The Defense Acquisition University (2006) defines a major weapon system as a 
combination of elements functioning together and used by the Armed Forces to 
accomplish combat missions.  According to the GAO (06-391), a weapon system is 
classified major if it has an estimated total expenditure for research, development, test, 
and evaluation of more than $365 million or procurement costs more than $2.19 billion3.  
The GAO has assessed numerous major weapon systems.  These assessments include the  
____________________ 
3 FY 2000 constant dollars     
 6 
 
26 programs analyzed during this study and have annually been reported by the GAO 
during the past four years (GAO, 2003-2006, 03-476, 04-248, 05-301, and 06-391).  The 
studies were read to gain an understanding of each program’s technology maturity, 
design stability, and other program issues, plus additional comments by the  
agency if necessary.   
Contract Incentives 
 
Incentive contracts are designed to motivate exceptional performance by 
monetarily rewarding contractors for lack of cost overruns, avoiding schedule delays, and 
delivering weapon systems with the required capabilities.  If this study’s findings also 
suggest a contractor’s stock return increases during schedule delays, and the DoD is 
trying to monetarily incentivize him to avoid delays, there is a terrible disconnect.  
Although the theory that contractors value delays is new, incentive contracts have been 
utilized for years.  Following is a history of incentive contracts which will give us a better 
understanding of how they have been used in the past. 
History of Contract Incentives 
 
Contract incentives date back to 1908 when the Army contracted the Wright  
brothers to build a “heavier-than-air” flying machine.  The Army required the plane to fly 
a minimum of 40 miles per hour (mph); if this speed was reached, the contractor would 
receive a bonus payment.  Even though it took three attempts to reach the desired 
performance, which caused a 10-month contract delay, the brothers eventually flew the 
machine 42.5 mph and were awarded the entire $5,000 incentive payment (Vernon 
Edwards, 2002). 
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These types of incentives were used again in World War I when the government 
offered performance incentives and capital investment to Bethlehem Steel for ship 
building.  The War Department developed an evaluated-fee contract and made part of the 
fee dependent on the contractor’s performance.  The Navy’s Bureau of Ships adopted this 
concept, except it made a percentage of the fee fixed and the rest varied as a bonus for 
reducing costs.  In 1943 the Under Secretary of the Navy, James V. Forrestal, received 
minimal support when he tried to convert as many contracts as possible to incentive 
contracts.  At that time, contractors were not proficient at cost estimating and there were 
too many changes to the contracts.  If incentives were offered, these challenges would 
have hindered their ability to make a profit.  The lesson learned from this was that 
incentives can be effective if they are used at the right time, place, and under certain 
conditions (Thomas Snyder, 2002).  
The National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) was able to 
successfully reintroduce this concept 20 years later.  Initially, only NASA and the Navy 
used award-fee contracts. The Air Force and Army rejected the concept until Secretary of 
the Air Force Robert C. Seamans mandated its use in the 1970s for the B-1 and F-15 
programs (Snyder, 2002).  Today, all of DoD uses incentive contracts for major defense 
weapon system programs. 
Previous Studies Conducted  
 
Despite the fact that this contracting vehicle has been used consistently for major 
defense acquisitions since the 1960s, there have been studies conducted over the past 30 
years, which suggested that contract incentives in this manner are ineffective at 
motivating contractors to perform efficiently.  For instance, Frederick Scherer (1964) 
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concluded contract incentives were ineffective in weapons development contracts and did 
not motivate cost efficiency.  A few years later, Irving Fisher (1968) studied the effect 
contract incentives had on procurement costs for major defense weapon systems.  Using 
statistical analysis, the evidence indicated that incentives did not motivate contractors to 
minimize costs and perform efficiently.  After reviewing major defense incentive 
contracts between FY 1999 through FY 2003, the GAO (2005, 06-66) found the DoD 
paid 90% of the available incentive fees regardless of the contractor’s performance.  
These results are important because they suggest the incentive program does not achieve 
results as it is intended, which is to motivate outstanding performance.   Some examples 
include the C-17, F/A-22 Raptor, F/A-35 Joint Strike Fighter, and the Space Based 
Infrared Satellite System (SBIRS)-High, which are included in the next section of 
reading. 
During the Air Force’s reliability, maintainability, and availability (RM&A) 
evaluation of the C-17, the GAO assessed its results.  The Air Force determined the C-17 
was fully mission-capable and awarded the contractor a $5.91 million incentive payment.  
However, during the GAO’s investigation, it found the aircraft was not functionally 
effective in aeromedical evacuation capability. As a result, the contractor was overpaid 
$750,000 (GAO, 1996, GAO/NSIAD 96-126).  Although this may seem immaterial 
considering DoD’s investment in the research, development, test, evaluation, and 
procurement of major weapon systems was $135 billion in FY 2004 (GAO, 2004, 04-
248), this is not an isolated incident and seems to happen rather often with much larger  
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monetary consequences4.  For instance, the GAO (2005, 06-66) reviewed an F/A-22’s  
incentive contract and found between fiscal years 1999 and 2003, the company earned  
91% of its incentives, $848.7 million, even though it was 13.3% over its scheduled initial  
operation capability.  DoD’s single development program, the Joint Strike Fighter,  
 (AAAS, 2006) experienced a 26+% increase in costs from its initial estimate (GAO, 
2006, 06-585T).  In addition, the aircraft has experienced development delays as well as 
significant cost increases and technical problems, yet the contractor still received 100% 
of its incentive fee totaling $494 million (GAO, 2005, 06-66).  In an even more alarming 
discovery, the SBIRS-(High) received 74% ($160 million) of its available incentive fee 
while its research and development costs increased 99.5% over its baseline, experienced 
years of delays, and increased the per unit cost by 315% (GAO, 2006, 06-585T). 
Again, these are not the exceptions; they appear to be the norm.  The importance 
of these overpayments is well known to the GAO.  It studied a population of 597 major 
weapon systems contracts from FY 1999 through FY 2003 and found incentive payments 
totaling over $8 billion were paid to contractors as a whole regardless of the acquisition 
outcome (GAO, 2005, 06-66).   Definitely, there appears to be substantial evidence to 
state poor contractor performance is rewarded.  Nevertheless, this research intends to 
maintain an unbiased view.  To do so, possible criticisms have been addressed in the 
following paragraphs.     
Rebuttal 
 
An argument could be made that even though these reports indicate the  
____________________ 
4 2004 Base Year dollars     
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government pays incentives for poor performance, the contractor did in fact perform  
above standards based on the program manager’s interpretation of his work.  For 
example, many reports show enormous schedule delays in programs, which lead a reader 
to believe the contractor is at fault and does not deserve an incentive fee.  However, many 
of these reports do not indicate the cause of the delay.  As a result, it may be unfair to 
immediately criticize the contractor’s performance when in fact it may not have been his 
fault; obstacles such as governmental budget constraints will delay a program and are 
completely out of a contractor’s control.    
One could also refute the scrutiny the F/A-22 program has endured over the years.  
The aircraft’s development began in 1986 and the contractor has been paid incentive fees 
at times throughout the program.  Undeniably, it has taken an extremely long time to 
build this plane, for various reasons.  For instance, the F/A-22’s integrated avionics and 
stealth technologies were both late to mature.  The jet was in product development nine 
years before the integrated avionics reached its maturity; consequently, it was a 
contributing factor to schedule delays and cost growth.  In fact, from 1997 until its 2003 
report, the cost of avionics software development increased over $800 million (GAO, 
2003, 03-476).  Contrary to the program’s negativity, many reports do not highlight the 
fact the aircraft was designed and built for the Cold War.  But that war ended, leaving the 
tactical fighter with capabilities no longer needed, while lacking those that are currently 
needed.  At that point it had to be reconfigured with systems to defend against threats in 
the 21st century (Keith Ashdown, 2006).   Consequently, the first initial operation 
capability aircraft was delivered 19 years after the program started (GAO, 2006, 06-391).  
Ironically, the military is encountering the same challenges today as the Wright brothers 
 11 
 
did nearly 100 years ago.  That is to say, it is better to wait for a weapon system that will 
do the job it is intended for rather than one that was completed on time and does not 
perform to DoD specifications.   
In contrast, there is a perception the government pays an incentive fee regardless 
if a contractor’s performance deserves rewarding.  In an attempt to understand how 
contractors view the incentive program, Snyder (2002) interviewed employees from some 
of the largest companies in the defense industry, as well as some moderate-sized 
companies who were all competing for government contracts5.  He found contractors 
have started to count award fees as part of their total profit.  The general consensus from 
the interviews was that contractors alter their proposals when an award fee is offered.  
They submit a low bid that cuts into the company’s profit margin to stay competitive and 
win the contract. Although they do not depend on 100% of the fee, this strategy is still 
considered a moderate risk to them since they have never been denied a large percentage 
of the fee in the past.  Typically 85-90% of incentive fees are awarded, which helps 
explain why contractors do not rate this strategy as high risk.  However, this scheme is 
not done haphazardly; research is accomplished prior to bidding, such as reviewing 
historical records and conducting detailed analysis to estimate the probable fee (Snyder, 
2002). 
Based on much of the research conducted, it appears to show evidence the  
contract incentives do not incentivize.  If the findings suggest a contractor’s wealth 
increases because of a delay, but the DoD offers an incentive to avoid delays paying  
___________________ 
5All participants were guaranteed nonattribution to themselves and their organizations. 
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nearly 100% of the available fee, the government could potentially see additional 
schedule delays and an enormous amount of incentives paid for little or no motivation on 
the contractor’s part.   
The motivation for this research is based on Carden’s (2006) study which 
suggests shareholders may value contract delays in government contracts over the 
incentive payments that are garnered. In other words, the Department of Defense attempts  
to incentivize companies to avoid delays, when in fact the delay increases the company’s 
wealth beyond any award fee amount the government could offer.  He found the 
shareholders of the contractors that built the Comanche, Boeing and United Tech (which 
owns Sikorsky), increased their wealth by 7.1% and 8.2%, respectively.  It appears it 
would be difficult for the DoD to monetarily incentivize a company if its stock returns 
increase significantly after a delay is announced.  If in fact delays do cause contractors’ 
returns to increase, they are benefiting two-fold. They receive an incentive regardless of 
their performance plus they increase company wealth at the same time.   
At this point, the reader should understand the role contract incentives play in the 
concept of this study and know this research will continue testing Carden’s (2006) 
hypothesis by adding 26 more programs to the study and all of the delays each program 
encounters.  But the answer to the question, how will the impact delays have on a DoD 
contractor’s stock price be measured, has not been explained; this methodology will be 
introduced next.  
The most powerful and reliable tool available to measure this impact is event 
study methodology; it has been studied extensively and corroborates this assertion.  The 
next several paragraphs will explain basic theory, define an event, illustrate disciplines 
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where event studies have been applied and its evolution, give details why this method is 
the most applicable for this research, and end with general steps taken to conduct an 
event study.     
Event Study Method 
 
Event studies are based on the assumption that the marketplace is efficient 
(Eugene Fama, Lawrence Fisher, Michael Jensen, and Richard Roll, 1969).  Gerald 
Dwyer (2001) defines an event as a change, development or announcement that could 
possibly produce a considerable change in the asset’s price over some period of time.  An 
event can be company specific, actions taken by the government, and is often information 
announced to share holders through financial news such as The Wall Street Journal or a 
corporate proxy statement.  Some examples of an event are a merger, stock-split, earnings 
report, and an increase in dividends.  The market then efficiently uses the information 
regarding the event and incorporates it into the stock price of the firm.  
Up to and including the work of Eugene Fama, Lawrence Fischer, Michael 
Jensen, and Richard Roll, (1969) event studies were limited to studying the impact stock 
splits had on a company’s financial position using data from monthly returns.  But 
Stephen Brown and Jerold Warner’s (1980) work introduced a new concept, testing the 
event’s statistical significance with abnormal returns.  An abnormal return measures the 
impact an event had on a stock price during the event window.  It is equal to the 
difference between an actual return and a normal return.  A normal return is defined as 
what the return would have been without the event.  Brown and Warner (1980) studied 
and compared an event study’s three general models to estimate the normal return:  mean 
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adjusted returns, market adjusted returns, and market and risk adjusted return; all three 
produced similar results.     
With further research, they analyzed daily returns rather than monthly returns 
(Brown and Warner, 1984).  Using their previous models as the foundation, the 
researchers introduced the mean adjusted returns model, market adjusted returns model, 
and ordinary least squares (OLS) market returns model to identify the impact of an event 
on the stock market.  They found the market adjusted returns and OLS models produced 
similar results, were much more powerful with daily returns than monthly, and 
outperformed the mean adjusted returns model.  Brown and Warner (1984) additionally 
found the exchange-listing used correlates with the power of the model.  In other words, 
the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE) securities demonstrated a higher power than 
American Stock Exchange securities.  Given these facts, their findings strongly suggest 
collecting data daily is more powerful than monthly. 
As a result, a multitude of studies using daily returns have measured the impact an 
unexpected event has on the firm’s value.  A few examples that used the market returns 
model include a study conducted on a scandal involving Russia’s most successful oil 
company, Yuko, 1982’s Tylenol poisonings, and the airline industry’s stock returns after 
September 11th.  After Yuko’s two founders were arrested for embezzlement and other 
illegal acts, the company’s single day stock prices dropped 15% on the Russian Market 
(Alexei GorIaev and Konstantin Sonin, 2004)6.  The study that tested the significance of 
the effects that the 1982’s Tylenol poisonings had on Johnson and Johnson’s market  
___________________ 
6 The Yuko affair attracted world-wide attention  
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value found a $1.24 billion wealth decline (Mark Mitchell, 1989).  The catastrophic event 
of September 11th provided mixed reaction between small and large airlines with respect 
to the Air Transportation Safety and System Stabilization Act.  The study provided  
evidence that major airlines benefited while smaller airlines did not (David Cart and 
Betty Simpkins, 2004).   
These are a few examples of studies that used this method, but its use is much 
more widespread than these illustrations.  Finance and accounting has used event study  
methodology to measure the impact of numerous corporate events such as mergers and   
acquisitions, economists have used it to measure the impact of policy changes, and it has  
been used in the field of law to measure class action litigations and tax law changes.   
Although this method has been widely accepted in the business world, the   
literature has been select concerning DoD and the acquisition process.  Nevertheless, this 
method is the most applicable tool to measure the market’s reaction to schedule delays 
for several reasons.  One, the selected government contractors for this research all trade 
in the stock market, which allows their returns to be observed.  Two, shareholders can 
learn about the event (schedule delay) from information distributed to market participants 
through financial and business news media.  Three, delays to these multibillion dollar 
contracts may materially affect a company’s financial statement.  At a minimum, upsets 
such as these trigger employee layoffs and assembly plant shut downs.  Lastly, it has 
been validated by well respected scholars; Eugene Fama, Stephen Brown, and Jerold 
Warner, have extensively tested this empirical method.   
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Conducting an Event Study 
 
Even though there is not a distinctive set of rules for conducting an event study, 
several studies throughout the literature provided general steps.  Identify the event of 
interest and select the time periods.  There are two windows that must be identified, the  
event period and estimation period.  The researcher decides the length of both based on  
previous research, a time frame sensible to the study, and personal experience.  At a  
minimum, the event period should be a 3-day window.  Day 0 is the event day, one day 
prior (-1) captures leakage of information and the day following (+1) captures the market 
in case the market was closed before the announcement.  Selecting only the day of the 
event (day 0) is not recommended because the researcher may not be able to capture the 
event’s full impact.  An event period is defined as either a predetermined number of days 
both before and after the event day (e.g., -5 to +5) or a selected number of days 
succeeding the event (e.g., +5).  The estimation period is the time frame prior to the event 
(e.g., -1, -2,).  According to the literature read during this review, estimation periods 
varied between approximately 200-250 days, while event periods were between 8 and 21 
days.  At this point, a market index (e.g., S & P 500, Dow Jones) should be identified as a 
benchmark.   
Next, and very important, is to investigate any other potential events that took 
place simultaneously with the studied event and exclude those sample sets from the 
analysis.  If these are not removed, it will not be possible to determine which event 
caused the impact.  The normal return can be predicted using constant mean return model 
or market returns model (Craig MacKinlay 1997).  Both produce similar results, but the 
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market model is the most widely used.  Lastly, test for significance by checking if the 
abnormal returns differ significantly from zero.   
This should give the reader a general concept of this methodology.  The next 
chapter will describe the methodology that will be used to accomplish this research. 
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III. Methodology 
 
 
This chapter defines the procedures required to conduct the event study which 
measured the impact delays have on a company’s stock return.  It describes each step in 
the process including applicable formulas that were used.  The actual calculations 
summary and result interpretations are found in Chapter 4.   
Define the Event  
 
This study’s event is defined as publicly announced contract delays of six months 
or greater on major Acquisition Category I (ACAT I) weapon system contracts.  As 
mentioned earlier, the DoD (2005) requires only delays of six months or greater to be 
reported, therefore this research will do the same.  Schedule delays for each of the 26 
programs in this research were collected by analyzing major newspapers, magazine and 
journal articles, and business, finance and industry news indexed in the LexisNexis 
database.  All delays were analyzed regardless of the reason for the delay; this research 
was interested in measuring the impact a delay has on the company and not what caused 
the delay.  Once the delay dates were identified, news surrounding the delay was 
researched ensuring there were no other announcements or incidents (e.g., stock splits) 
that may interfere with the determination if the market reaction was due to the delay 
announcement.  This was done by evaluating news articles with respect to the company 
found in news media during the event window.  If other events occurred, the delay was 
not measured because it is not possible to distensile the reaction to the contract 
announcement versus the potentially confounding event.      
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Day 0 labels the delay announcement; days prior to this are labeled -1, -2 (i.e., 
day one prior to the event, day two prior to the event) and so on; likewise days following 
the public release are labeled +1, +2 (i.e., one day after the event, two days after the 
event).   
Estimation Procedure 
 
There were 200 observations of each company’s daily return and the market 
return with respect to the relevant delay.  This duration is consistent with the other studies 
performed, such as Brown and Warner’s research in 1980 and 1984.  Even with the 
aerospace industry experiencing many events that could cause the market to fluctuate, 
this period covers two full business quarters.  After reviewing the companies’ quarterly 
reports and not observing numerous events that affected their stock prices, it was 
determined this duration provides a fair baseline to conduct the event study.  These 
observations started at day -188 and ended at day +11.  The first 186 days of observations 
(-188 to -3) defines the estimation period and it is used to establish what would be a 
normal return absent the event.  The event window is (-2 to +11) and captures nearly two 
full weeks of open trading days.  The two days prior to the event were chosen to capture 
abnormal returns before the event day caused by anticipation of a delay prior to the 
official announcement.  The event windows are shown in Figure 1 below. 
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        Estimation Period                                                                  Post Event Period 
 
_____________________________________________________________ 
|          |          |          |          |          |          |          |          |          |          | 
-188    -100     -3       -2       -1         0        +1      +2      +11    +12     +25 
 
           Event Period 
Figure 1.  Event Window 
 
Selection Criteria 
 
DoD’s top five contractors, Lockheed-Martin, Boeing, Northrop Grumman, 
General Dynamics and Raytheon, respectively, are primary contractors for the 26 
programs that were analyzed.  These acquisition programs encompass major weapon 
systems as reported by the GAO (03-476, 04-248, 05-301, and 06-391) since 2003.  The 
companies’ and the Russell 3000 index’s daily closing returns were collected from 
Yahoo!Finances database and downloaded into an Excel spreadsheet.   
Normal and Abnormal Returns 
 
In order to determine what the firm’s stock price would have been without the  
event, the normal return must be estimated; this can be done using either the constant 
mean return model or the market returns model.  Both produce similar results; however 
Brown and Warner’s (1984) market returns model, as shown in (1), is used 
predominantly throughout the literature and was selected for this research.  The market 
returns model assumes a linear relationship between the company’s stock return and an 
index.  Using a firm’s stock return as the dependent variable and the selected market 
index, Russell 3000, as the independent variable, an ordinary least squares regression was 
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performed to estimate market returns.  The market returns model is illustrated as formula 
(1). 
mtiiit RR βα +=  (1) 
 
where: 
 
itR is the return for a given stock (i) at a specified time (t) 
 
mtR is the return for the given market index (m) at a specified time (t) 
 
 Once the normal return was estimated, abnormal returns were calculated.  This is 
the actual return experienced during the event window less the normal return.  This 
determined the impact of the event.  This was computed using the abnormal returns  
model as shown below (2). 
( )mtiiitit RRAR βα +−=  (2) 
where: 
ARit is the abnormal returns at a specified time (t) 
Rit is the actual return of the given stock at the specified time (t) 
(αi+βiRmt) is the expected normal return with regard to the market returns 
at a specified time (t) 
In order to determine the significance, the cumulative abnormal returns for the 
post event period were summed and tested.  In an efficient market, these returns have an 
expected value of zero.  Therefore, the farther away the value is from zero, the greater the 
significance that the event had an effect on the company’s stock price.  If it is 
considerably greater than zero, the null hypothesis can be rejected.   
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Ho:  Contract delay does not significantly impact the firm’s returns. 
  Ha:  Contract delay does significantly impact the firm’s returns.  
The significant value of the cumulative abnormal return was computed by 
dividing it by the estimated standard deviation as shown below in formula (3): 
                                                                                                                
                                                                                                                      (3) 
 
where:   
      tA   = Average abnormal return 
                                                                                                           (4) 
 
  = Estimate of observation standard deviation                                  (5) 
 
  
 
 = Average abnormal return for observation period                        
                                                                                                          
                                                                                                                    (6) 
 
Summary 
 
The research thus far leads one to consider there may be a correlation between 
delays and contractors’ stock returns.  It gives the impression continued investigating 
would be beneficial to both the DoD and taxpayers.  If in fact a contractor’s wealth 
increases significantly during a delay, the government will have difficulty motivating 
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him.  The benefit he receives from the delay through a stock increase far outweighs the 
incentive fee DoD could offer to avoid delays.  As budgets become tighter and weapons 
systems costs become greater, it is imperative DoD dollars are scrutinized extensively to 
ensure the government does not over compensate its vendors.   
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IV. Results and Analysis 
 
 
The top five government contractors experienced several contract delays among 
the 26 weapon systems programs analyzed for this research.  Lockheed Martin led with 
25 delays, of which 13 were considered clean; Boeing had 18 delays and three of them 
were clean; Northrop’s 15 delays included seven that were considered clean, two of 
General Dynamics’ four delays were clean events; and Raytheon experienced one delay 
announcement and it was clean.  This provided a total of 26 contract delays (events).  
Table 1 illustrates the descriptive statistics for each of the company’s clean events and the 
parameters estimated using the market model (formula 1).  The research literature’s r2 
values ranged from as low as .01 to as high as .72.  As shown in Table 1, this research 
resulted in similar r2 values as well.  The α and β estimates were also similar to other 
event studies researched although this study did not have β estimates that reached above 
1.0 as were seen in other studies.  Based on these estimates, the abnormal returns for each 
event period were calculated using formula 2.  The abnormal returns were summed to 
derive the cumulative abnormal returns and then tested for significance using formula 3.  
The cumulative abnormal returns and the significance level for each of the 26 delays can 
be found in Appendix B.   
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Table 1.  Contract Delays’ Descriptive Statistics 
Company Program Event Date 
alpha  
Estimate 
beta  
estimate R
2 Standard  Error 
Lockheed AEHF 16-Aug-01 0.0014 0.1860 0.0158 0.0216 
Lockheed JSF 3-Jan-05 0.0007 0.6045 0.1458 0.0104 
Lockheed JSF 6-Jan-04 -0.0001 0.5808 0.1419 0.0126 
Lockheed Raptor 11-Jul-01 0.0009 0.2033 0.0193 0.0226 
Lockheed Raptor 8-Oct-99 -0.0009 0.6955 0.0934 0.0241 
Lockheed Raptor 19-Aug-98 -0.0002 0.4894 0.0944 0.0138 
Lockheed Raptor 12-Jan-94 0.0000 0.5845 0.0498 0.0120 
Lockheed Raptor 12-Apr-93 0.0018 0.8141 0.1068 0.0135 
Lockheed Raptor 15-Jul-90 -0.0024 0.8840 0.1346 0.0165 
Lockheed Raptor 27-Apr-90 -0.0017 0.7146 0.1050 0.0170 
Lockheed SIBRS 1-Jan-00 -0.0032 0.5104 0.0348 0.0283 
Lockheed SIBRS 12-Feb-99 -0.0049 0.5050 0.0252 0.0443 
Lockheed THAAD 7-Mar-96 0.0006 0.9039 0.1555 0.0122 
Lockheed THAAD 20-Feb-96 0.0008 0.8059 0.1198 0.0122 
Boeing EELV 17-Aug-05 0.0009 0.9381 0.2057 0.0122 
Boeing EELV 15-Aug-01 0.0001 0.6955 0.2007 0.0206 
Boeing Osprey 11-Feb-02 -0.0017 0.4543 0.0389 0.0269 
Northrop DD(X) 14-Nov-05 0.0001 0.6723 0.2596 0.0088 
Northrop DD(X) 9-Aug-04 -0.0017 0.2859 0.0031 0.0378 
Northrop DD(X) 28-Jun-04 -0.0016 0.3020 0.0037 0.0379 
Northrop Global Hawk 19-May-97 0.0006 0.4420 0.0871 0.0112 
Northrop NPOESS 9-Jun-06 0.0005 0.6626 0.2168 0.0086 
Northrop NPOESS 24-Feb-04 0.0002 0.5521 0.1434 0.0111 
Northrop NPOESS 21-Jun-96 0.0003 0.6751 0.1406 0.0109 
General Dynamic EFV 16-Nov-05 -0.0003 0.7177 0.3149 0.0075 
General Dynamic EFV 4-Aug-05 -0.0001 0.7326 0.2833 0.0078 
Raytheon Excalibur 22-May-06 0.0006 0.7575 0.1990 0.0099 
   Independent variable: Russell 3000 Index 
   Dependent variable:  Respective Company 
 
Data Analysis 
 
 There were a total of 26 events analyzed.  Of these, 10 null hypotheses were 
accepted because the abnormal returns were not significantly different from zero. The 
other 16 events had CARs that were found to be statistically significant; therefore the null 
hypotheses were rejected.  These are identified in Appendix B as well. 
 The events were segregated into four categories to determine if there were 
negative impacts for certain events and a positive reaction for others.  The four categories 
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were funding, redesign/restructure, delays caused by external sources, and development 
problems.     
Results:  Budget Related Delays 
 
Budgetary constraints were the most prevalent reason for delays found in this 
study; 9 of the 12 budget related delays DoD contractors experienced resulted in a decline 
in each company’s stock value.  The programs that had negative delays included 
Boeing’s Evolved Expendable Launch Vehicle (EELV), which delayed fielding in order 
to fund another program; the delivery of Northrop’s Global Hawk was delayed at least 
one year in order to remain in the FY 97- FY 00 budgets; and the National Polar-Orbiting 
Operational Environmental Satellite System’s (NPOESS) availability was delayed eight 
months during a budget cut.  Milestone decision C for General Dynamics’ Expeditionary 
Fighting Vehicle (EFV) was delayed nine months as well as the initial operational 
capability and full rate production award for two years.  Lastly, Lockheed’s Raptor 
program experienced several budget related delays, which included production and first 
flight delays, which caused a drop in the company’s wealth.    
Two contractors experienced an increase in their stock value after three separate 
delays.  Northrop Grumman’s wealth grew after the DD(X) Destroyer’s system 
development and demonstration was delayed 7 months; and Lockheed Martin’s stock 
value rose when its Space Based Infrared System-High (SBIRS) program was delayed in 
1999 and its Joint Strike Fighter (JSF) program in Jan 2005.  Table 2 exhibits the 12 
budget related delays and the monetary impact of each one at different points during each 
delay’s event window.            
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Table 2.  Budget Related Delays 
Program Company 
Max 
(peak of event) 
Overall 
(entire window) 
Avg 
(entire window) 
EELV 
15 Aug 01 BA (13,218,552) (12,283,995) (7,872,354) 
NPOESS 
24 Feb 04 NOC (9,148,157) (6,226,095) (4,998,524) 
Raptor  
8 Oct 99 LMT (8,305,069) (8,305,069) (4,781,925) 
EFV 
16 Nov 05 GD (6,923,539) (464,781) (1,900,534) 
THAAD 
20 Feb 96 LMT (3,157,113) (2,910,090) (1,621,711) 
Global Hawk 
19 May 97 NOC (1,990,014) (1,990,014) (1,255,763) 
Raptor 
12 Apr 93 LMT (1,133,245) (805,531) (287,599) 
Raptor 
15 Jul 90 LMT (847,361) (496,566) (210,685) 
Raptor 
12 Jan 94 LMT (397,951) (360,156) (195,346) 
JSF 
3 Jan 05 LMT 8,168,032 6,003,616 1,984,931 
SBIRS 
12 Feb 99 LMT 6,767,481 6,266,901 3,729,168 
DD(X) 
16 Nov 05 NOC 1,814,094 1,362,384 1,025,977 
 
Boeing’s value slumped $13.3 million and suffered an overall decline of $12.3 
million when its EELV program was delayed.  The stock value gradually declined during 
the event window until day +10 when its value dropped to the lowest point of nearly 
10%.  The CARs were statistically significant to the <.01 level from day +3 until day 
+11. 
Northrop’s stock value gradually dropped until day +12 when it fell 7.2%.  The 
following day its value started to climb again, which may be the point where the market 
started to stabilize and the shareholders no longer reacted to the delay announcement.  
The CARs were statistically significant from day 0 throughout the event window; overall 
Northrop’s stock value declined 4.9%.    
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Lockheed Martin’s stock value plummeted after the October 1999 announcement 
its Raptor program was delayed.  This $8.3 million plunge equaled 31% of the company’s 
stock value on 5 October, the day prior to the event period.  Because Lockheed Martin 
was also having problems with its C130-J program during this time frame, some may 
argue it caused the company’s stock decline.  It is true the company announced in early 
November 1999 a 54% decline in its 2000 net per share expectations.  However, this 
should not be associated with the stock value drop discussed here.  This specifically 
measured the market’s reaction of the Raptor’s delay announcement on 8 October 1999.  
No other confounding events took place during the event window to cause doubt the 
decline was a result of a different event.   
Even though General Dynamics’ steepest drop was $6.9 million at one point 
during the event window, overall its stock value only decreased $464.8 thousand.  
Undeniably this amount is exceedingly small considering the company’s value of $202.4 
million on D-3.  Nevertheless, it shows a negative impact to a company’s stock value 
when a budget delay is announced.   
The responsiveness to the stock market shown here after a contract delay 
announcement reflects intuitive shareholders; they are aware that funding for ACAT I 
programs is very competitive and often times programs are removed from future DoD 
budgets for an extended period of time or completely cancelled.  It also makes a 
statement that shareholders are very cognizant of the impact a contract delay could have 
on the company’s stock value.  A negative impact may be explained by the likelihood 
investors are skeptical future funds will be available for the program, therefore forcing 
cancellation.  In addition, long delays and uncertain future budgets could trigger the 
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company to shut down the production line and layoff employees, all of which negatively 
impact the firm financially.     
 Although 75% of the data suggest funding delays negatively impact company 
wealth, 25% of the data contradict this theory by showing positive reactions for the JSF, 
SIBRS, and DD(X) Destroyer programs.  There may be a logical explanation for the 
JSF’s reaction and overall stock value increase of 1.7%.  Funds were pulled from this 
program to place it outside of the six-year defense plan.  The money freed from that 
move was approved for the Raptor to go from less than 100 aircraft back up to a fleet of 
190-200 fighters.  As a result of this increase in the Raptor’s inventory, procurement 
would remain for the next three years and keep the production lines running for the 
following five years.  It was believed this would buy time to plea for additional JSF 
funding.  Because Lockheed Martin is the prime contractor of both major weapon 
systems, the company ultimately benefited from the JSF’s delay (David Bond, 2005).  
This certainly would explain the positive impact associated with this funding related 
delay. 
On the other hand, the SIBRS High positive reaction to a budget cut is not as 
understandable.  The Air Force slipped the spaced based system deployment five years.  
As a result, a dramatic cost growth was expected and a two-year delay in fielding the 
system would result.  At the same time the SIBRS Low demonstration program, which 
was supposed to be critical in reducing technical risk, was cancelled (Bond, 2005).  
Based on the theory that budget delays negatively impact a firm, there may have been 
other positive events unable to be captured in this study that explain the 10.1% increase 
in the company’s stock value. 
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Also, Northrop’s stock value rose slightly (2.7%) when the DD(X) Destroyer’s 
system development and demonstration start was delayed.  One possible reason for the 
positive rather than negative impact was because this delay was only for seven months; a 
relatively short period of time considering the average length for the other funding related 
delays was nearly two years.  The shareholders may have been more confident this 
program was not in jeopardy.  Again, reinforcing the impression share holders are aware 
the impact delays can have on a company’s wealth. 
Results:  Redesign/Restructure Related Delays 
 
The second leading reason for delays was caused by program 
redesign/restructures.  Lockheed’s Raptor and SBIRS programs fell under this category.  
The Raptor slipped one year because it re-designated its low rate initial production 
(LRIP) lot to production test vehicles, and re-designated its LRIP II lot as LRIP I.   In 
addition, the SBIRS program slipped two years due to a restructure.  Unlike the negative 
reaction funding issues appear to have on a company’s wealth, these two delays showed a 
positive reaction.  A possible explanation for this:  a schedule slip offers investors the 
security knowing the program will continue and isn’t threatened to be cancelled due to 
funding issues.  It also reinforces Carden’s (2006) hypothesis that the wealth of 
shareholders is significantly impacted by a DoD contractual delay.  Table 3 shows the 
wealth generated during these two events. 
Table 3.  Redesign/Restructure Related Delays 
Program Company 
Value 
(peak of event) 
Overall 
(entire window) 
Avg 
(entire window) 
Raptor 
19 Aug 98 Lockheed 4,222,068  4,222,068  1,590,290  
SBIRS 
1 Jan 00 Lockheed 3,166,095  2,614,561  2,191,877  
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It should be noted that when the Raptor’s LRIP, contract award and first delivery 
slipped one year, it was declared that no cost changes would result.  Likewise, Lockheed 
was awarded a $531 million contract modification to restructure the SIBRS program 
resulting in its two year delay.  Lockheed’s stock value notably increased after both of 
these delays were announced.  During the Raptor delay overall its wealth increased 5.4%; 
as a result of the SIBRS delay its value jumped 10.7%.  Ironically, funding was not an 
issue for either program, which reinforces the hypothesis that contractors value delays 
when they are not initiated by a funding constraint.    
Results:  External Source Related Delays 
 
Lockheed’s Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) program was the 
only delay in this research caused by an external source.  The lowest the firm’s stock 
value declined was 4.1% after the announcement the THAAD program was delayed four 
years to foster a competitive fly-off between THAAD and the Navy’s Theater Wide 
Defense System (TWDS).  Because the two weapon systems have complementary roles, 
there was a threat that the THAAD program would be cancelled if its performance was 
inferior to the TWDS.   This could possibly explain the decline in Lockheed’s stock 
value.  Table 4 reveals the reaction to Lockheed’s wealth at different times during the 
event window.  
Table 4.  External Source Related Delays 
Program Company 
Value  
(peak of event) 
Overall 
(entire window) 
Avg 
(entire 
window) 
THAAD 
7 Mar 96 Lockheed (1,936,060) (704,465) (1,100,310) 
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Lockheed’s stock value showed a statistically significant decline from the 
announcement day and continued until D+ 4 when it dropped 4.1%.  Beginning on D+5, 
the company’s wealth started to rise again.  This may indicate that the shareholders 
reacted immediately following the announcement, and after five days of trading, the 
market could have possibly started to stabilize.   
Results:  Development Related Delays 
 
The last category, development problems, increased Boeing’s wealth substantially 
when the Osprey was delayed for three years because of tilt rotor difficulties.  Even 
though there were problems with the aircraft, a delay of this sort may have had a positive 
impact due to the fact the program will continue to progress.  As shown earlier, if the 
shareholders are confident funds are available for programs to continue, they react 
positively to contract delays.  The wealth increase throughout the event period is shown 
in Table 5 below. 
Table 5.  Development Related Delays 
Program Company 
Max 
(peak of event) 
Overall 
(entire window) 
Avg 
(entire window) 
Osprey 
11 Feb 02 Boeing 13,242,776  13,242,776  7,917,430  
 
 Undeniably, the magnitude that Boeing’s stock value increased was significant; 
the company was valued at $106.6 million the day prior to the event window and its stock 
value increased $13.2 million overall during the event window.  Its wealth gradually rose 
during the event window.  They may consider the three year delay as an extension to the 
program and not view it negatively.         
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 Based on these findings, there is a strong indication contract delays both 
positively and negatively influence a company’s wealth following an ACAT I  contract 
delay.  Delays resulting from budget constraints tend to decrease a company’s value 
possibly because of the concern a program may remain unfunded for an indefinite period 
of time or the program will eventually be cancelled.  As a result, the loss of millions and 
even billions of dollars is at stake.  Delays such as redesigns/restructures or development 
problems appear to increase the stock value.  When a program is delayed for such 
reasons, the program continues to strive and shareholders seem confident the program 
will continue to increase profits.  These results also imply the companies’ shareholders 
are aware of the impact each type of delay has on a program.  As a result, they react very 
quickly and intelligently.   
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V.  Discussion 
 
 
Conclusion 
 
 Major weapon systems contract delays caused by budget cuts negatively affect the 
company’s stock value significantly while delays for other reasons generate wealth for 
the shareholders.   
Observations and Discussion 
 
 The findings of this research provide substantially more evidence that DoD 
contract delays significantly impact a firm’s returns.  While Carden’s (2006) study 
revealed a positive impact when the Comanche’s Engineering and Manufacturing 
Development (EMD) phase was delayed for 5 years, this study has discovered contract 
delays can have a positive or negative impact on the stock value and does not appear to 
be contractor specific.   
 This study extended Carden’s (2006) research and analyzed five companies, 26 
programs, and 63 separate contract delay announcements.  However, the final data 
testable were four contractors, 10 programs and 16 events.  Several events were discarded 
because other events took place during the same event window.  If they had been 
included, it would not have been clear which event actually caused the market reaction.  
Some programs were newer, therefore did not have as many delays, and the null 
hypothesis was accepted for nearly half of the final events tested.  Nevertheless, these 
findings are still substantial and support Carden’s (2006) initial research that concluded 
shareholders value contract delays.     
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 The two companies Carden (2006) observed in his study indicated the results are 
not company specific and this research came to the same conclusion with the observation 
of DoD’s top five contractors.  By extending Carden’s research, these findings suggest 
contract delays caused by a budget cut decreased the company’s value while delays for 
other reasons increased the company’s stock value.  In several instances, it was quite 
significant.  The overall decreased value in regards to budget cuts ranged from as little as 
$360 thousand to as much as $12.2 million.  In other instances, the company generated 
wealth after a delay and the amounts were also significant.  The overall increase resulting 
from those delays ranged between $968.0 thousand and $13.0 million.   
 The market reaction time in this study was also similar to Carden’s (2006) 
findings.  He noted there was an observed reactionary delay of approximately 5 days.  
This research found there was observed reaction typically around day +4 to day +6.  
Several events had statistically significant CARs at the 1% and 5% level as soon as day 
one.      
 This study’s intentions were not to determine the mechanism that increases the 
company’s profit after a delay announcement.  It was to substantiate Carden’s (2006) 
hypothesis that contractors value delays and provide the groundwork that it is a 
widespread phenomenon; not just a one time incident.  This is strictly a discussion of 
stock value and not that of corporate loss and earnings.   
Follow up Research 
 
 Even though this research was much larger than the intial study, the number of 
events tested is rather small compared to the overall DoD acquisition process.  But it does 
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provide additional data to justify conducting more research and possibly addressing the 
findings with DoD decision makers. 
 Follow up research must continue to explore this issue.  It may be beneficial to 
conduct research on older programs that date back many years.  A comparison can be 
made between older programs and the ones currently active to see if there is a timeline 
trend.  Comparisons should be made between incentives paid and wealth generated by 
delays; investigate whether or not more incentives are paid to contractors who have 
suffered financially due to funding issues.   Also conduct research to see how a delay 
affects the subcontractors;  are they affected by the delays in the same manner as the 
prime contractors?   
Schedule delays and cost over runs have been investigated for a numerous number 
of years, but this type of study is the first to investigate delays using event study 
methodology.  Thus far it has produced statistically significant data to aid in answering 
the question why our acquisition system suffers from so many delays.  It may also 
provide answers as to why the DoD continues to incentivize contractors to stay on 
schedule when in fact the company experiences greater benefits when the program is 
delayed.   
This research has shown the company’s wealth increases significantly after a 
contract delay is announced; sometimes as high as 30%7.  Additionally the contractor is 
paid an incentive fee, typically 5% of the original program budget, as motivation to avoid 
delays.  In other words, the contractor receives an incentive fee to avoid delays yet the 
___________________ 
7Delays caused by funding and external sources showed a negative impact to the company’s wealth.  
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company’s wealth increases when a program is delayed.  It is a win-win situation for the 
contractor and costs the DoD billions of dollars each year.  This compelling study may 
assist the decision makers and leadership to restructure contract incentives possibly 
leading to enormous cost savings to the DoD.        
 
.   
 
 .   
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Appendix A:  Contractors’ Ticker Symbols and Program Titles 
 
Lockheed Martin (LMT) 
Advanced Deployable System (ADS) 
Advanced Extremely High Frequency Satellite (AEHF) 
C-5 Avionics Modernization Program (AMP) 
F/A-22 Raptor 
F-35 Joint Strike Fighter 
Space Based Infrared System-High (SIBRS) 
Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) 
 
Boeing (BA) 
Active Electronically Scanned Array Radar (AESA) 
Airborne Laser (ABL) 
CH-47F Improved Cargo Helicopter 
Evolved Expendable Launch Vehicle (EELV) 
Future Combat Systems (FCS)  
Joint Tactical Radio System Cluster 1(JTRS) 
V-22 Osprey 
 
Northrop Grumman (NOC) 
Advanced SEAL Delivery System (ASDS) 
DD (X) Destroyer 
Future Aircraft Carrier CVN-21  
Global Hawk Unmanned Aerial Vehicle 
National Polar-Orbiting Operational Environmental Satellite System (NPOESS) 
Space Tracking and Surveillance System (STSS) 
 
General Dynamics (GD) 
Expeditionary Fighting Vehicle (EFV) 
Joint Tactical Radio System Cluster 5 (JTRS) 
Land Warrior 
Warfighter Information Network-Tactical (WIN-T) 
 
Raytheon (RTN) 
Excalibur Precision Guided Extended Range Artillery Projectile 
Joint Land Attack Cruise Missile Defense Elevated Netted Sensor System 
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Appendix B:  Cumulative Abnormal Returns and Significance  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
JSF 3 Jan 05 
Window Date CAR T-Stat T-Crit Prob 
D-2 30-Dec-04 0.0053 0.5134 0.6083   
D-1 31-Dec-04 0.0045 0.4291 0.6684   
D 3-Jan-05 -0.0145 -1.3947 0.1648   
D+1 4-Jan-05 -0.0244 -2.3429 0.0202 ** 
D+2 5-Jan-05 0.0034 0.3273 0.7438   
D+3 6-Jan-05 -0.0016 -0.1575 0.8750   
D+4 7-Jan-05 0.0024 0.2290 0.8191   
D+5 10-Jan-05 0.0033 0.3148 0.7533   
D+6 11-Jan-05 0.0083 0.8015 0.4239   
D+7 12-Jan-05 0.0181 1.7344 0.0845 * 
D+8 13-Jan-05 0.0138 1.3239 0.1872   
D+9 14-Jan-05 0.0207 1.9881 0.0483 ** 
D+10 18-Jan-05 0.0235 2.2590 0.0250 ** 
D+11 19-Jan-05 0.0173 1.6604 0.0985 * 
 
 
 
 
 
JSF 6 Jan 04 
Window Date CAR T-Stat T-Crit Prob 
D-2 2-Jan-04 -0.0124 -0.9888 0.3241   
D-1 5-Jan-04 -0.0313 -2.4985 0.0133 ** 
D 6-Jan-04 -0.0349 -2.7811 0.0060 *** 
D+1 7-Jan-04 -0.0335 -2.6738 0.0082 *** 
D+2 8-Jan-04 -0.0134 -1.0729 0.2847   
D+3 9-Jan-04 -0.0029 -0.2343 0.8150   
D+4 12-Jan-04 -0.0159 -1.2654 0.2073   
D+5 13-Jan-04 -0.0123 -0.9838 0.3265   
D+6 14-Jan-04 -0.0055 -0.4388 0.6614   
D+7 15-Jan-04 -0.0116 -0.9289 0.3542   
D+8 16-Jan-04 -0.0096 -0.7690 0.4429   
D+9 20-Jan-04 -0.0249 -1.9901 0.0480 ** 
D+10 21-Jan-04 -0.0162 -1.2916 0.1981   
D+11 22-Jan-04 -0.0221 -1.7627 0.0796 * 
 
 
 
Lockheed Martin’s cumulative abnormal returns and significance for each contract 
delay.  *p<.1; **p<.05***p<.01 
 
 Ho rejected 
Ho accepted 
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Raptor 11 Jul 01 
Window Date CAR T-Stat T-Crit Prob 
D-2 9-Jul-01 -0.0213 -0.9460 0.3454   
D-1 10-Jul-01 0.0000 -0.0008 0.9994   
D 11-Jul-01 -0.0099 -0.4376 0.6622   
D+1 12-Jul-01 0.0051 0.2239 0.8231   
D+2 13-Jul-01 -0.0017 -0.0734 0.9416   
D+3 16-Jul-01 -0.0057 -0.2519 0.8014   
D+4 17-Jul-01 -0.0003 -0.0144 0.9885   
D+5 18-Jul-01 0.0093 0.4122 0.6806   
D+6 19-Jul-01 0.0286 1.2662 0.2070   
D+7 20-Jul-01 0.0177 0.7829 0.4347   
D+8 23-Jul-01 0.0105 0.4653 0.6423   
D+9 24-Jul-01 0.0157 0.6961 0.4873   
D+10 25-Jul-01 0.0149 0.6592 0.5106   
D+11 26-Jul-01 0.0516 2.2892 0.0232 ** 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
SBIRS 1 Jan 00 
Window Date CAR T-Stat T-Crit Prob 
D-2 30-Dec-99 0.0252 0.8917 0.3737   
D-1 31-Dec-99 0.1031 3.6560 0.0003 *** 
D 3-Jan-00 0.0368 1.3059 0.1932   
D+1 4-Jan-00 0.0938 3.3263 0.0011 *** 
D+2 5-Jan-00 0.1019 3.6118 0.0004 *** 
D+3 6-Jan-00 0.1201 4.2554 0.0000 *** 
D+4 7-Jan-00 0.1265 4.4848 0.0000 *** 
D+5 10-Jan-00 0.0836 2.9624 0.0035 *** 
D+6 11-Jan-00 0.0613 2.1734 0.0310 ** 
D+7 12-Jan-00 0.1292 4.5779 0.0000 *** 
D+8 13-Jan-00 0.1039 3.6840 0.0003 *** 
D+9 14-Jan-00 0.0891 3.1574 0.0019 *** 
D+10 18-Jan-00 0.0706 2.5019 0.0132 ** 
D+11 19-Jan-00 0.1067 3.7804 0.0002 *** 
 
 
 
 
Ho accepted 
Ho  rejected  
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Raptor 8 Oct 99 
Window Date CAR T-Stat T-Crit Prob 
D-2 6-Oct-99 -0.0641 -2.6707 0.0082 *** 
D-1 7-Oct-99 -0.0247 -1.0301 0.3043   
D 8-Oct-99 -0.0553 -2.3047 0.0223 ** 
D+1 11-Oct-99 -0.0697 -2.9034 0.0041 *** 
D+2 12-Oct-99 -0.1123 -4.6790 0.0000 *** 
D+3 13-Oct-99 -0.1349 -5.6187 0.0000 *** 
D+4 14-Oct-99 -0.1926 -8.0239 0.0000 *** 
D+5 15-Oct-99 -0.2456 -10.2304 0.0000 *** 
D+6 18-Oct-99 -0.2385 -9.9335 0.0000 *** 
D+7 19-Oct-99 -0.2243 -9.3420 0.0000 *** 
D+8 20-Oct-99 -0.2675 -11.1436 0.0000 *** 
D+9 21-Oct-99 -0.2740 -11.4132 0.0000 *** 
D+10 22-Oct-99 -0.2825 -11.7670 0.0000 *** 
D+11 25-Oct-99 -0.3096 -12.8962 0.0000 *** 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
SBIRS 12 Feb 99 
Window Date CAR T-Stat T-Crit Prob 
D-2 10-Feb-99 0.0327 0.7404 0.4600   
D-1 11-Feb-99 0.0151 0.3406 0.7338   
D 12-Feb-99 0.0159 0.3592 0.7199   
D+1 16-Feb-99 0.0392 0.8870 0.3762   
D+2 17-Feb-99 0.0259 0.5860 0.5586   
D+3 18-Feb-99 0.0325 0.7346 0.4635   
D+4 19-Feb-99 0.0426 0.9642 0.3362   
D+5 22-Feb-99 0.0725 1.6399 0.1027   
D+6 23-Feb-99 0.0743 1.6800 0.0946 * 
D+7 24-Feb-99 0.1021 2.3101 0.0220 ** 
D+8 25-Feb-99 0.1091 2.4685 0.0145 ** 
D+9 26-Feb-99 0.1019 2.3056 0.0222 ** 
D+10 1-Mar-99 0.0770 1.7415 0.0833 * 
D+11 2-Mar-99 0.1010 2.2859 0.0234 ** 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Ho rejected  
Ho rejected  
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Raptor 19 Aug 98 
Window Date CAR T-Stat T-Crit Prob 
D-2 17-Aug-98 -0.0132 -0.9644 0.3361   
D-1 18-Aug-98 -0.0127 -0.9286 0.3543   
D 19-Aug-98 0.0057 0.4187 0.6759   
D+1 20-Aug-98 0.0332 2.4206 0.0165 ** 
D+2 21-Aug-98 0.0516 3.7657 0.0002 *** 
D+3 24-Aug-98 0.0272 1.9846 0.0487 ** 
D+4 25-Aug-98 0.0450 3.2856 0.0012 *** 
D+5 26-Aug-98 0.0330 2.4051 0.0172 ** 
D+6 27-Aug-98 0.0020 0.1488 0.8819   
D+7 28-Aug-98 -0.0032 -0.2345 0.8149   
D+8 31-Aug-98 0.0044 0.3225 0.7474   
D+9 1-Sep-98 0.0168 1.2285 0.2208   
D+10 2-Sep-98 0.0399 2.9103 0.0041 *** 
D+11 3-Sep-98 0.0538 3.9227 0.0001 *** 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
THAAD 7 Mar 96 
Window Date CAR T-Stat T-Crit Prob 
D-2 5-Mar-96 -0.0101 -0.8400 0.4020   
D-1 6-Mar-96 -0.0162 -1.3477 0.1794   
D 7-Mar-96 -0.0315 -2.6177 0.0096 *** 
D+1 8-Mar-96 -0.0248 -2.0637 0.0404 ** 
D+2 11-Mar-96 -0.0304 -2.5229 0.0125 ** 
D+3 12-Mar-96 -0.0350 -2.9098 0.0041 *** 
D+4 13-Mar-96 -0.0405 -3.3680 0.0009 *** 
D+5 14-Mar-96 -0.0343 -2.8533 0.0048 *** 
D+6 15-Mar-96 -0.0264 -2.1918 0.0296 ** 
D+7 18-Mar-96 -0.0202 -1.6804 0.0946 * 
D+8 19-Mar-96 -0.0129 -1.0756 0.2835   
D+9 20-Mar-96 -0.0032 -0.2670 0.7898   
D+10 21-Mar-96 -0.0221 -1.8346 0.0682 * 
D+11 22-Mar-96 -0.0147 -1.2255 0.2219   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Ho rejected  
Ho rejected  
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THAAD 20 Feb 96 
Window Date CAR T-Stat T-Crit Prob 
D-2 15-Feb-96 -0.0009 -0.0705 0.9439   
D-1 16-Feb-96 -0.0093 -0.7607 0.4478   
D 20-Feb-96 -0.0048 -0.3935 0.6944   
D+1 21-Feb-96 -0.0030 -0.2483 0.8042   
D+2 22-Feb-96 -0.0089 -0.7337 0.4641   
D+3 23-Feb-96 -0.0118 -0.9652 0.3357   
D+4 26-Feb-96 -0.0362 -2.9687 0.0034 *** 
D+5 27-Feb-96 -0.0350 -2.8704 0.0046 *** 
D+6 28-Feb-96 -0.0372 -3.0550 0.0026 *** 
D+7 29-Feb-96 -0.0492 -4.0349 0.0001 *** 
D+8 1-Mar-96 -0.0448 -3.6720 0.0003 *** 
D+9 4-Mar-96 -0.0288 -2.3646 0.0191 ** 
D+10 5-Mar-96 -0.0385 -3.1598 0.0018 *** 
D+11 6-Mar-96 -0.0453 -3.7192 0.0003 *** 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Raptor 12 Jan 94 
Window Date CAR T-Stat T-Crit Prob 
D-2 10-Jan-94 -0.0074 -0.6225 0.5344   
D-1 11-Jan-94 -0.0025 -0.2128 0.8317   
D 12-Jan-94 0.0067 0.5600 0.5762   
D+1 13-Jan-94 0.0005 0.0389 0.969   
D+2 14-Jan-94 -0.0155 -1.2991 0.1955   
D+3 17-Jan-94 -0.0254 -2.1230 0.0351 ** 
D+4 18-Jan-94 -0.0156 -1.3067 0.1929   
D+5 19-Jan-94 -0.0249 -2.0783 0.0391 ** 
D+6 20-Jan-94 -0.0260 -2.1716 0.0312 ** 
D+7 21-Jan-94 -0.0393 -3.2866 0.0012 *** 
D+8 24-Jan-94 -0.0441 -3.6857 0.0003 *** 
D+9 25-Jan-94 -0.0465 -3.8857 0.0001 *** 
D+10 26-Jan-94 -0.0373 -3.1138 0.0021 *** 
D+11 27-Jan-94 -0.0421 -3.5166 0.0005 *** 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Ho rejected  
Ho rejected  
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Raptor 12 Apr 93 
Window Date CAR T-Stat T-Crit Prob 
D-2 7-Apr-93 -0.0067 -0.5019 0.6163   
D-1 8-Apr-93 -0.0106 -0.7878 0.4318   
D 12-Apr-93 -0.0013 -0.0951 0.9244   
D+1 13-Apr-93 -0.0137 -1.0249 0.3067   
D+2 14-Apr-93 0.0026 0.1957 0.8451   
D+3 15-Apr-93 0.0058 0.4292 0.6683   
D+4 16-Apr-93 -0.0017 -0.1272 0.8989   
D+5 19-Apr-93 0.0014 0.1011 0.4598   
D+6 20-Apr-93 -0.0097 -0.7204 0.4722   
D+7 21-Apr-93 -0.0213 -1.5880 0.1140   
D+8 22-Apr-93 -0.0480 -3.5843 0.0004 *** 
D+9 23-Apr-93 -0.0551 -4.1087 0.0001 *** 
D+10 26-Apr-93 -0.0859 -6.4122 0.0000 *** 
D+11 27-Apr-93 -0.0611 -4.5579 0.0000 *** 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Raptor 15 Jul 90 
Window Date CAR T-Stat T-Crit Prob 
D-2 12-Jul-90 0.0009 0.0542 0.9568   
D-1 13-Jul-90 -0.0167 -1.0422 0.2987   
D 16-Jul-90 -0.0017 -0.1033 0.9179   
D+1 17-Jul-90 0.0207 1.2860 0.2001   
D+2 18-Jul-90 0.0112 0.6975 0.4863   
D+3 19-Jul-90 0.0202 1.2568 0.2104   
D+4 20-Jul-90 0.0185 1.1517 0.2509   
D+5 23-Jul-90 -0.0027 -0.1704 0.8649   
D+6 24-Jul-90 -0.0421 -2.6230 0.0094 *** 
D+7 25-Jul-90 -0.1374 -8.5562 0.0000 *** 
D+8 26-Jul-90 -0.0995 -6.1940 0.0000 *** 
D+9 27-Jul-90 -0.1003 -6.2455 0.0000 *** 
D+10 30-Jul-90 -0.0687 -4.2809 0.0000 *** 
D+11 31-Jul-90 -0.0805 -5.0141 0.0000 *** 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Ho rejected  
Ho rejected  
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Raptor 27 Apr 90 
Window Date CAR T-Stat T-Crit Prob 
D-2 25-Apr-90 0.0033 0.1768 0.8598   
D-1 26-Apr-90 -0.0171 -0.9183 0.3597   
D 27-Apr-90 -0.0200 -1.0765 0.2831   
D+1 30-Apr-90 0.0082 0.4395 0.6608   
D+2 1-May-90 -0.0045 -0.2432 0.8081   
D+3 2-May-90 -0.0098 -0.5287 0.5977   
D+4 3-May-90 0.0063 0.3390 0.7350   
D+5 4-May-90 0.0004 0.0215 0.9829   
D+6 7-May-90 -0.0146 -0.7865 0.4326   
D+7 8-May-90 -0.0057 -0.3065 0.7596   
D+8 9-May-90 -0.0027 -0.1464 0.8838   
D+9 10-May-90 0.0013 0.0700 0.9442   
D+10 11-May-90 0.0196 1.0531 0.2937   
D+11 14-May-90 0.0136 0.7294 0.4667   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Ho accepted  
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EELV 17 Aug 05 
Window Date CAR T-Stat T-Crit Prob 
D-2 15-Aug-05 0.0099 0.8103 0.4188   
D-1 16-Aug-05 0.0024 0.1949 0.8457   
D 17-Aug-05 0.0124 1.0136 0.3121   
D+1 18-Aug-05 0.0072 0.5885 0.5569   
D+2 19-Aug-05 0.0134 1.1026 0.2716   
D+3 22-Aug-05 0.0200 1.6415 0.1024   
D+4 23-Aug-05 0.0138 1.1326 0.2589   
D+5 24-Aug-05 0.0136 1.1143 0.2666   
D+6 25-Aug-05 0.0116 0.9473 0.3447   
D+7 26-Aug-05 0.0037 0.3023 0.7628   
D+8 29-Aug-05 0.0159 1.3069 0.1929   
D+9 30-Aug-05 0.0053 0.4359 0.6634   
D+10 31-Aug-05 -0.0019 -0.1597 0.8733   
D+11 1-Sep-05 -0.0196 -1.6066 0.1098  
 
 
 
 
 
 
Osprey 11 Feb 02 
Window Date CAR T-Stat T-Crit Prob 
D-2 7-Feb-02 0.0056 0.2078 0.8356   
D-1 8-Feb-02 0.0158 0.5881 0.5572   
D 11-Feb-02 0.0425 1.5818 0.1154   
D+1 12-Feb-02 0.0491 1.8291 0.0690 * 
D+2 13-Feb-02 0.0870 3.2389 0.0014 *** 
D+3 14-Feb-02 0.0869 3.2361 0.0014 *** 
D+4 15-Feb-02 0.0915 3.4088 0.0008 *** 
D+5 19-Feb-02 0.0755 2.8105 0.0055 *** 
D+6 20-Feb-02 0.0619 2.3036 0.0224 ** 
D+7 21-Feb-02 0.0915 3.4073 0.0008 *** 
D+8 22-Feb-02 0.1019 3.7963 0.0002 *** 
D+9 25-Feb-02 0.1000 3.7243 0.0003 *** 
D+10 26-Feb-02 0.1061 3.9519 0.0001 *** 
D+11 27-Feb-02 0.1242 4.6247 0.0000 *** 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Boeing’s cumulative abnormal returns and significance for each contract delay. 
*p<.1; **p<.05***p<.01 
Ho accepted  
Ho rejected  
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EELV 15 Aug 01 
Window Date CAR T-Stat T-Crit Prob 
D-2 13-Aug-01 -0.0086 -0.4207 0.6744   
D-1 14-Aug-01 -0.0166 -0.8081 0.4201   
D 15-Aug-01 -0.0375 -1.8267 0.0694 * 
D+1 16-Aug-01 -0.0266 -1.2959 0.1966   
D+2 17-Aug-01 -0.0360 -1.7551 0.0809 * 
D+3 20-Aug-01 -0.0535 -2.6059 0.0099 *** 
D+4 21-Aug-01 -0.0799 -3.8902 0.0001 *** 
D+5 22-Aug-01 -0.0782 -3.8066 0.0002 *** 
D+6 23-Aug-01 -0.0788 -3.8382 0.0002 *** 
D+7 24-Aug-01 -0.0638 -3.1052 0.0022 *** 
D+8 27-Aug-01 -0.0716 -3.4864 0.0006 *** 
D+9 28-Aug-01 -0.0883 -4.2988 0.0000 *** 
D+10 29-Aug-01 -0.0998 -4.8589 0.0000 *** 
D+11 30-Aug-01 -0.0927 -4.5154 0.0000 *** 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Ho rejected  
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NPOESS 9 Jun 06 
Window Date CAR T-Stat T-Crit Prob 
D-2 7-Jun-06 -0.0055 -0.6459 0.5191   
D-1 8-Jun-06 -0.0024 -0.2769 0.7821   
D 9-Jun-06 0.0002 0.0224 0.9822   
D+1 12-Jun-06 -0.0059 -0.6951 0.4879   
D+2 13-Jun-06 0.0028 0.3220 0.7478   
D+3 14-Jun-06 -0.0133 -1.5582 0.1209   
D+4 15-Jun-06 -0.0011 -0.1320 0.8952   
D+5 16-Jun-06 0.0010 0.1140 0.4547   
D+6 19-Jun-06 -0.0012 -0.1379 0.8905   
D+7 20-Jun-06 -0.0050 -0.5793 0.5631   
D+8 21-Jun-06 -0.0064 -0.7537 0.4520   
D+9 22-Jun-06 -0.0042 -0.4949 0.6212   
D+10 23-Jun-06 -0.0101 -1.1846 0.2377   
D+11 26-Jun-06 -0.0158 -1.8496 0.0660 * 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
NPOESS 24 Feb 04 
        
Window Date CAR T-Stat T-Crit Prob 
D-2 20-Feb-04 0.0016 0.1501 0.8809   
D-1 23-Feb-04 -0.0180 -1.6532 0.1000   
D 24-Feb-04 -0.0332 -3.0456 0.0027 *** 
D+1 25-Feb-04 -0.0202 -1.8530 0.0655 * 
D+2 26-Feb-04 -0.0269 -2.4631 0.0147 ** 
D+3 27-Feb-04 -0.0307 -2.8172 0.0054 *** 
D+4 1-Mar-04 -0.0205 -1.8784 0.0619 * 
D+5 2-Mar-04 -0.0407 -3.7280 0.0003 *** 
D+6 3-Mar-04 -0.0447 -4.0994 0.0001 *** 
D+7 4-Mar-04 -0.0654 -5.9923 0.0000 *** 
D+8 5-Mar-04 -0.0656 -6.0137 0.0000 *** 
D+9 8-Mar-04 -0.0719 -6.5879 0.0000 *** 
D+10 9-Mar-04 -0.0647 -5.9294 0.0000 *** 
D+11 10-Mar-04 -0.0489 -4.4836 0.0000 *** 
 
 
Northrop’s cumulative abnormal returns and significance for each contract delay.   
*p<.1; **p<.05***p<.01 
Ho accepted  
Ho rejected  
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Global Hawk 19 May 97 
Window Date CAR T-Stat T-Crit Prob 
D-2 15-May-97 -0.0255 -2.2866 0.0234 ** 
D-1 16-May-97 -0.0325 -2.9161 0.0040 *** 
D 19-May-97 -0.0347 -3.1088 0.0022 *** 
D+1 20-May-97 -0.0243 -2.1804 0.0305 ** 
D+2 21-May-97 -0.0109 -0.9784 0.3292   
D+3 22-May-97 -0.0187 -1.6790 0.0948 * 
D+4 23-May-97 -0.0149 -1.3384 0.1824   
D+5 27-May-97 -0.0141 -1.2618 0.2086   
D+6 28-May-97 -0.0242 -2.1670 0.0315 ** 
D+7 29-May-97 -0.0186 -1.6653 0.0976 * 
D+8 30-May-97 -0.0173 -1.5489 0.1231   
D+9 2-Jun-97 -0.0308 -2.7662 0.0062 *** 
D+10 3-Jun-97 -0.0323 -2.8993 0.0042 *** 
D+11 4-Jun-97 -0.0381 -3.4203 0.0008 *** 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                            NPOESS 21 Jun 96     
Window Date CAR T-Statistic T-Crit Prob 
D-2 19-Jun-96 -0.0108 -0.9903 0.3233   
D-1 20-Jun-96 -0.0045 -0.4097 0.6825   
D 21-Jun-96 -0.0051 -0.4670 0.6411   
D+1 24-Jun-96 -0.0038 -0.3475 0.7286   
D+2 25-Jun-96 -0.0012 -0.1066 0.9152   
D+3 26-Jun-96 0.0037 0.3382 0.7356   
D+4 27-Jun-96 -0.0022 -0.2020 0.8401   
D+5 28-Jun-96 -0.0043 -0.3935 0.6944   
D+6 1-Jul-96 -0.0100 -0.9177 0.3600   
D+7 2-Jul-96 -0.0044 -0.4042 0.6866   
D+8 3-Jul-96 -0.0027 -0.2457 0.8062   
D+9 5-Jul-96 -0.0035 -0.3258 0.7449   
D+10 8-Jul-96 0.0055 0.5061 0.6134   
D+11 9-Jul-96 0.0103 0.9471 0.1724   
 
 
 
 
 
 
Ho rejected  
Ho accepted  
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DD(X) 16 Nov 05 
Window Date CAR T-Stat T-Crit Prob 
D-2 14-Nov-05 0.0202 2.5211 0.0125 *** 
D-1 15-Nov-05 0.0251 3.1339 0.0020 *** 
D 16-Nov-05 0.0268 3.3570 0.0010 *** 
D+1 17-Nov-05 0.0215 2.6910 0.0078 * 
D+2 18-Nov-05 0.0131 1.6317 0.1044   
D+3 21-Nov-05 0.0089 1.1160 0.2659   
D+4 22-Nov-05 0.0034 0.4218 0.6736   
D+5 23-Nov-05 0.0130 1.6307 0.1046   
D+6 25-Nov-05 0.0084 1.0470 0.2965   
D+7 28-Nov-05 0.0030 0.3689 0.7126   
D+8 29-Nov-05 0.0152 1.9024 0.0587 ** 
D+9 30-Nov-05 0.0243 3.0331 0.0028 *** 
D+10 1-Dec-05 0.0146 1.8268 0.0693 *** 
D+11 2-Dec-05 0.0122 1.5244 0.1291   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
DD(X) 9 Aug 04 
Window Date CAR T-Stat T-Crit Prob 
D-2 5-Aug-04 -0.0102 -0.2714 0.7864   
D-1 6-Aug-04 -0.0149 -0.3945 0.6937   
D 9-Aug-04 -0.0163 -0.4321 0.6662   
D+1 10-Aug-04 -0.0197 -0.5231 0.6015   
D+2 11-Aug-04 -0.0215 -0.5697 0.5696   
D+3 12-Aug-04 -0.0159 -0.4205 0.6746   
D+4 13-Aug-04 -0.0160 -0.4241 0.6720   
D+5 16-Aug-04 -0.0221 -0.5847 0.5595   
D+6 17-Aug-04 -0.0287 -0.7610 0.4476   
D+7 18-Aug-04 -0.0124 -0.3278 0.7435   
D+8 19-Aug-04 -0.0135 -0.3507 0.7215   
D+9 20-Aug-04 -0.0173 -0.4574 0.6479   
D+10 23-Aug-04 -0.0149 -0.3956 0.6929   
D+11 24-Aug-04 0.00064 0.01703 0.9864   
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DD(X) 28 Jun 04 
Window Date CAR T-Stat T-Crit Prob 
D-2 24-Jun-04 -0.0009 -0.0234 0.5093   
D-1 25-Jun-04 0.0023 0.0604 0.9519   
D 28-Jun-04 0.0003 0.0075 0.9940   
D+1 29-Jun-04 0.0134 0.3557 0.7224   
D+2 30-Jun-04 0.0184 0.4866 0.6271   
D+3 1-Jul-04 0.0231 0.6127 0.5408   
D+4 2-Jul-04 0.0164 0.4348 0.6642   
D+5 6-Jul-04 0.0249 0.6587 0.5109   
D+6 7-Jul-04 0.0391 1.0346 0.3022   
D+7 8-Jul-04 0.0420 1.1115 0.2678   
D+8 9-Jul-04 0.0507 1.3440 0.1806   
D+9 12-Jul-04 0.0557 1.4756 0.1418   
D+10 13-Jul-04 0.0453 1.2004 0.2315   
D+11 14-Jul-04 0.0389 1.0302 0.3043   
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Excal 22 May 06 
Window Date CAR T-Stat T-Crit Prob 
D-2 18-May-06 0.0051 0.5169 0.3029   
D-1 19-May-06 0.0082 0.8356 0.2022   
D 22-May-06 0.0127 1.2869 0.1997   
D+1 23-May-06 0.0012 0.1206 0.4521   
D+2 24-May-06 -0.0087 -0.8799 0.8100   
D+3 25-May-06 -0.0141 -1.4313 0.1540   
D+4 26-May-06 -0.0161 -1.6292 0.1050   
D+5 30-May-06 -0.0080 -0.8129 0.7913   
D+6 31-May-06 0.0027 0.2729 0.3926   
D+7 1-Jun-06 0.0006 0.0589 0.4765   
D+8 2-Jun-06 -0.0121 -1.2229 0.2229   
D+9 5-Jun-06 -0.0036 -0.3684 0.7130   
D+10 6-Jun-06 -0.0227 -2.3003 0.0225 ** 
D+11 7-Jun-06 -0.0296 -3.0028 0.0030 *** 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Raytheon’s cumulative abnormal returns and significance for each contract delay 
*p<.1; **p<.05***p<.01 
Ho accepted  
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EFV 16 Nov 05_ 
Window Date CAR T-Stat T-Crit Prob 
D-2 14-Nov-05 -0.0342 -4.5291 0.0000 *** 
D-1 15-Nov-05 -0.0152 -2.0138 0.0455 ** 
D 16-Nov-05 -0.0190 -2.5129 0.0128 ** 
D+1 17-Nov-05 -0.0144 -1.9012 0.0588 * 
D+2 18-Nov-05 -0.0165 -2.1868 0.0300 * 
D+3 21-Nov-05 -0.0166 -2.1924 0.0296 ** 
D+4 22-Nov-05 -0.0131 -1.7372 0.0840 * 
D+5 23-Nov-05 -0.0113 -1.4938 0.1369   
D+6 25-Nov-05 -0.0043 -0.5641 0.5734   
D+7 28-Nov-05 0.0016 0.2098 0.4170   
D+8 29-Nov-05 0.0120 1.5855 0.1146   
D+9 30-Nov-05 0.0044 0.5775 0.2822   
D+10 1-Dec-05 -0.0026 -0.3432 0.6341   
D+11 2-Dec-05 -0.0023 -0.3040 0.6193   
 
 
 
 
EFV 4 Aug 05 
Window Date CAR T-Stat T-Crit Prob 
D-2 2-Aug-05 0.0003 0.0439 0.4825   
D-1 3-Aug-05 -0.0002 -0.0289 0.5115   
D 4-Aug-05 0.0005 0.0699 0.4722   
D+1 5-Aug-05 -0.0014 -0.1746 0.5692   
D+2 8-Aug-05 0.0081 1.0505 0.2949   
D+3 9-Aug-05 0.0056 0.7262 0.2343   
D+4 10-Aug-05 0.0065 0.8377 0.2016   
D+5 11-Aug-05 0.0112 1.4402 0.1515   
D+6 12-Aug-05 0.0097 1.2453 0.2146   
D+7 15-Aug-05 0.0081 1.0491 0.2955   
D+8 16-Aug-05 0.0123 1.5862 0.1144   
D+9 17-Aug-05 0.0128 1.6533 0.1000   
D+10 18-Aug-05 0.0131 1.6897 0.0928 * 
D+11 19-Aug-05 0.0160 2.0644 0.0404 ** 
 
 
 
 
 
 
General Dynamics cumulative abnormal returns and significance for each contract delay 
*p<.1; **p<.05***p<.01 
Ho rejected  
Ho accepted  
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